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NOTES
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE: NEW LAW FOR AN EXPANDING PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
In the last fifty years, the world has been the benefactor of an
"electronic revolution." Aided by the use of electronic technology,
spacemen are able to journey to the moon, and the population of the
earth is able instantaneously both to observe and to communicate with
the astronauts. This "revolution" also permits men to secretly observe
and record the private actions of their fellow man. Both America and
the rest of the world are presently confronted with the problem of un-
solicited and, in many instances, uncontrolled electronic surveillance.
WIRETAPPING
Neither wiretapping nor electronic eavesdropping are new. Both
probably started during the American Civil War, for "Both Union and
Confederate spies 'tapped' telegraph lines in order to secure military
information."' By 1900 telegraph and elementary telephone eavesdrop-
ping had been developed into an art. "Indignation over the interception
of news led to legislation in Illinois in 1895, and in California in 1905
to prohibit telephone wiretapping."2 This legislation provided the courts
with a new area of litigation:
In the days when the Constitution was written, the methods of
invasion of privacy were direct and sometimes even brutal. Arrests
and physical searches and seizures made up the bulk of the invasions.
In these cases, the victim was fully aware of the officer's actions,
and could take steps to correct the situation. The private citizen
then, had at least a reasonable opportunity to take what shelter
he could under the provisions of the Constitution .... The Supreme
Court and the other courts had had notable difficulty in trying to
clarify the area of wiretapping, bugging, and the ever more refined
electronic developments. These techniques have introduced a new
concept of privacy invasion, further complicating an already diffi-
cult area. The thing seized in such cases is conversation, and the
seizure may not involve physical entry, if the appropriate technique
is used.'
Olmstead v. United States4 was the first wiretapping case to reach
the Supreme Court of the United States. Federal agents in Seattle
were attempting to enforce the National Prohibition Act, and in the
course of their investigation Federal officers tapped several telephone
lines and compiled written notes on the conversations that were over-
'SENATOR EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS 36 (1967).
'Id.; Ill. Stats, Telegraph and Telephone, Ch. 134, § 16, and West. Cal. Penal Codes
§ 474 (West 1970).
OLONG, supra note 1.
'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
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heard. At the trial the defendants objected to the admission of this
evidence on the grounds that wiretapping is a violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The
trial court allowed the admission of this evidence ,and the U. S. Su-
preme Court, by a 5-4 decision upheld the ruling of the trial court.
Chief Justice Taft stated:
The United States takes no such care of telegraphic or telephone
messages as of mailed sealed letters. The amendment [4th] does
not forbid what was done here. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.5
Congress may, of course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages
by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in
federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from
the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a
meaning to the Fourth Amendment.6
In response to this decision, Congress passed the Federal Com-
niunications Act of 1934. 7 Section 605 of this act prohibited any person
not authorized by the sender from intercepting and divulging the con-
tents of any communication. Federal Agencies immediately started
to dispute the wording of this statute. The Justice Department inter-
preted a violation of Section 605 to require both an interception and
a divulgence outside of the Federal Government. Federal Agencies,
under this interpretation, believed that wiretapping was permissible
5Id. at 464.
'Id. at 465, 466. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states: ''The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.''
7Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). This Act exempted
such matters as routine work by communications workers and transmissions relating
to ships in distress. § 605. No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or trans-
mitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception,
to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a person em-
ployed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, or to proper
accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which
the communication may be passed, or to the master of a ship under whom he is serv-
ing, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on
demand of other lawful authority; and no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person;
and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any inter-
state or foreign communication by wire or radio and use the same or any information
therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto;
and no person having received such intercepted communication or having become ac-
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any
part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto: Provided, That this section shall
not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any
radio communication broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of
the general public, or relating to ships in distress.''
[Vol. 32
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provided that the contents of the intercepted message were not divulged
to agencies or persons outside of the Federal Government.8
The public record shows that during the period from 1934 to 1939,
the Department of the Interior, too-engaged in the tapping of
wires .... It seems safe to conclude that, during this period, wire-
tapping was a routine law enforcement technique among federal
agencies.'
In May of 1940, the future existence of the United States appeared
to be in jeopardy. Although, officially, wiretapping was illegal, Presi-
dent Roosevelt, who was concerned with national security, issued this
confidential memorandum to Attorney General Jackson:
I am convinced that the Supreme Court never intended any dictum
in the particular case [Olmstead] which it decided to apply to
the grave matter involving the defense of the Nation.
You are therefore authorized and directed in such cases as you
may approve, after investigation of the need in each case to
authorize the necessary investigating agents that they are at liberty
to secure information by listening devices directed to conversations
or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities
against the Government of the United States, including suspected
spies. You are requested further more to limit these investigations
so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as possible
to aliens.0
At the close of World War II, President Truman reinstated this
memorandum, and this Presidential Order has provided the legal basis
for federally conducted wiretaps. In national security cases, wiretapping
is tacitly approved; however, the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
which has been somewhat limited by the Omnibus Crime Control Act
of 1968,1 does not permit the introduction into a trial as evidence of
information obtained by the use of wiretaps.
In Nardone v. United States,2 the Supreme Court developed the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Any evidence, directly or indirect-
ly, obtained through the use of an illeegal wiretap, is inadmissible. In
order for evidence to be admissible at the trial, the prosecution must
show that a causal connection did not exist between the illicit wire-
tapping and the Government's proof. All evidence presented by the
Government must be obtained from an "independent source" and be
free from the "taint" of an illegal wiretap. 13
8LONG, supra note 1 at 138.
Old. at 87.
'OId. at 89.
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C.A. Chapter
119, § 2510-2520.
"Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937).
lId. at 341.
1971]
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ELECTRONIC INVASIONS OF PRIVACY
BY MEANS OTHER THAN WIRETAPPING
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was con-
strued in Goldman v. United States14 to apply only to telephonic and
telegraphic communications. Invasions are still possible by use of hid-
den microphones or "by wiring" an acquaintance of the suspect in order
to obtain incriminating evidence. The suspect will, hopefully, trust and
openly converse with the "wired" informer, and the concealed micro-
phone or tape recorder will relate the intentions of the suspect to the
police.
It was held in Silverman v, U.S 15 and in Clinton v. Commonwealth'6
that an invasion of the suspect's home actually takes place when the
police drive an electronic device, i.e., a "spike mike," into the wall of a
house. This action is considered to be a violation of the suspect's Con-
stitutional rights that are guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States.
The Supreme Court has taken a different position when the police
use an informer who is "wired for sound." Police will usually attach
a hidden microphone to an informer in hopes that the informer will be
successful in engaging the suspect in an incriminating conversation,
which will be either recorded on tape or transmitted to a police officer
located away from the vicinity of the conversation. In On Lee v. United
States,17 the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that this type of
police action was not an unreasonable search and seizure; therefore,
the conviction of On Lee, based on this evidence, was affirmed.
In Lopez v. United States,' one Lopez, in attempting to conceal a
tax liability, offered to Davis, who was a Federal Revenue Agent, a
$420 bribe to conceal this tax problem. Davis reported this attempted
bribe to his superiors, who instructed Davis to play along with the
scheme. Davis was then given a pocket recorder that enabled him to
obtain incriminating evidence against Lopez. The Supreme Court held
that the recording was not unconstitutionally obtained. The govern-
ment did not commit an unlawful invasion of the premises of Lopez.
"'Goldman v. United States, 361 U.S. 129 (1942).
'5Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
"Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963).
"7On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952). 'Chin Poy, an old acquaintance
and former employee of petitioner, entered the latter's laundry and engaged him in
conversation, in the course of which petitioner made incriminating statements which
led to his conviction for narcotic offenses. Unknown to petitioner, Chin Poy was a
'wired for sound' under-cover agent and the small microphone concealed on his person
transmitted all sounds to a narcotics agent . .. stationed outside the laundry with a
receiving set. Chin Poy was not called to testify about petitioner's incriminating state-
ments-probably because 'the very defects of character and blemishes of record which
made On Lee trust him with confidences would make a jury distrust his testimony'-
but the narcotics agent was allowed to relate the conversation as heard with the aid
of his receiving set."'
"'Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
[Vol. 32
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The recording merely substantiated the testimony of the agent's memory,
and the conversation between the agent and Lopez should be disclosed
with the recording as proof of the actual contents of the conversation.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lopez19 decision in Osborn v.
United States.2 0 Osborn was an attorney for Teamster President James
Hoffa. Osborn hired one Vick, who had gained the confidences of Os-
born and Hoffa but in reality was an under-cover police officer ,to make
background investigations of prospective jurors for Hoffa's criminal
trial. Osborn discovered that Vick's cousin was a prospective member
of Hoffa's jury, and Vick was told by Osborn to approach this cousin
to see if he would be susceptible to a bribe. Vick reported this incident
to government officials. Government attorneys obtained a federal dis-
trict court's permission to conceal a tape recorder on Vick in order to
determine whether Vick's allegation about Osborn was true. Vick then
reported to Osborn that the cousin of Vick would be "susceptible to
money for hanging the jury." Osborn offered the cousin, through Vick,
$10,000 for "hanging" the jury. The Supreme Court held (7-1) that
on these facts the use of the recording device was permissible and con-
sequently the recording itself was properly admitted.
U.S. v. White,' 1 which was decided on April 5, 1971, is the latest
case law in this area. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that
government agents may send informers into the homes of narcotics
suspects with hidden radio transmitters and use this recorded conver-
sation as evidence for the prosecution.
CURRENT CASE LAW AND TITLE III OF THE
FEDERAL OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL ACT
22
In Berger v. New York,23 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that any evidence obtained by means of electronic surveillance
would be inadmissible unless the police had (1) obtained authorization
from a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) established strong probable
cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed;
and (3) shown strong necessity for immediately obtaining the evidence.
The Court further required that the person to be subjected to electronic
surveillance be specifically identified, and required that a definite time
limit be set for the surveillance period. If these requirements were not
satisfied, the suspect's Constitutional "right to privacy," derived from
19 d.
'Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
'U.S. v. White, 39 U.S.L.W.4387, -___ U.S ..... (April 5, 1971). The Supreme Court,
with Justice Byron R. White delivering the opinion, stated at 4389 that this electronic
surveillance was not within "expectations of privacy [that] are constitutionally
' justifiable '-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence
of a warrant."
'Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title 11, 18 U.S.C.A. Chapter
119, § 25-10-2520.
'Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, would be
violated and the evidence would not be admissible in any subsequent
prosecution. In Katz v. United States, 24 decided shortly after Berger,
the Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment's 25 protection to
the entirety of the individual's surroundings. In Katz26 the F.B.I. had
an electronic listening and recording device located in the roof of a
public telephone booth from which Katz made phone calls, and his
interstate gambling activities were recorded and used during Katz's
trial as evidence. In a decision consistent with the rationale in Berger,27
the Supreme Court held that the recordings were unlawfully obtained
and were therefore inadmissible as evidence.
Title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control Act 28 now governs
the use of all electronic surveillance in the United States at both the
federal and local levels. The Act, passed shortly after the Berger29 case,
embodies most of the Berger30 requirements. The provisions of this Act
apply to both private persons and law enforcement personnel. All sur-
veillances not authorized by these provisions are strictly prohibited,
and severe criminal and civil penalties are provided for violations. 31
24Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
nOlmstead, supra note 4 at 465, 466.
"Katz, supra note 24.
'Berger, supra note 23.
2Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C.A. Chapter
119, § 2510-1520.
'Berger, supra note 23.
sId.
3Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C.A. Chapter
119, § 2510-2520. "'§ 2511. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter
any person who (a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication; (b)
willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any person to use or endeavor to use any
electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when-(i)
such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable, or
other like connection used in wire communication; or (ii) such device transmits com-
munications by radio, or interferes with the transmission of such communication; or
(iii) such person knows, or has reason to know, that such device or any component
thereof has been sent through the mail or transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce; or (iv) such use or endeavor to use (A) takes place on the premises of any
business or other commercial establishment the operations of which affect interstate
or foreign commerce; or (B) obtains or is for the purpose of obtaining information
relating to the operations of any business or other commercial establishment the
operations of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or (v) such person acts
in the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory or
possession of the United States; (c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to
any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire
or oral communication in violation of this subsection; or (d) willfully uses, or en-
deavors to use, the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire
or oral communication in violation of this subsection; shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
The telephone company provides a signal for your protection as the "use of a
recorder without recorder-connector equipment containing a tone-warning device is
contrary to the company's tariffs and is not permitted. If you do not want a record
made of what you are saying, ask the person with whom you are talking to dis-
connect the recording machine. When it is disconnected you will no longer hear the
[Vol. 32
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The manner of obtaining authorization for "interception of wire
or oral communication" is governed by Sections 2516 and 2518. Section
251632 provides that the Attorney General of the United States, or his
designated assistant, may apply to a Federal judge of competent juris-
diction for authorization for such interception by the F.B.I. or other
Federal agency having investigative responsibility under Section 2518
(7). Application prior to interception is dispensed with in certain
"emergency situations." Such surveillance may be used in the investi-
gation of a large number of enumerated Federal Crimes, including con-
spiracy to commit any of those enumerated.
In order to secure authorization, the application section 251833 must
also be complied with. This section requires that the application for an
electronic surveillance must include (1) the identity of the officer
making the surveillance; (2) a statement of the facts giving rise to
probable cause to believe that a crime has been, is being, or is about to
be committed; (3) a description of the nature of the intended surveil-
lance; (4) a description of the location or place of the surveillanco;
(5) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted; (6) a statement as to what
other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they
would appear likely to fail or to be too dangerous if tried; and (7)
a statement as to the period of time for which the surveillance will be
maintained.
Upon such application, the judge may allow such surveillance3 4 if he
determines that: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the sur-
veillance will uncover evidence of such crime; (2) normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or would be dangerous or
likely to fail if tried; and (3) there is probable cause to believe that
'beep' tone." This is an administrative provision and failure to comply may result
in the loss of your telephone.
"§ 2520. Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed,
or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any
person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept,
disclose, or use such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such
person-(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the
rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is higher; (b) puni-
tive damages; and (c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reason-
ably incurred. A good faith reliance on a court order or on the provisions of section
2518 (7) of this chapter shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal
action brought under this chapter."
111d. at § 2516 (1), (2). These crimes include espionage, treason, riots, atomic energy,
murder, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, bribery in sporting contests, transmission of
wagering information, bribery of public officials, witnesses or jurors, obstruction of
criminal investigation, Presidential assessinations, interference with -commerce by
threats or violence, interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeer-
ing enterprises, offer, acceptance or solicitation to influence operations of employee
benefit plan, theft from interstate commerce, embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds, interstate transportation of stolen property, counterfeiting, illicit drug traffic,
and extortionate credit transactions.
21d. at § 2518 (1-10).
T Id. at § 2518 (2).
1971]
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the place subject to surveillance is being used, or is about to be used,
in connection with the offense or is either leased to or commonly used
by the suspect.
Each order authorizing electronic surveillance must specify the
identity of the person subject to surveillance, the place where the sur-
veillance is to occur, the nature of the communications to be inter-
cepted, and the period during which surveillance is authorized. No sur-
veillance may be authorized for a period longer than necessary to obtain
the object of the authorization, nor for more than thirty days. Exten-
sions may be granted in some cases. 35
Sections 2516 and 2518 (10) (a) provide for the suppression of evi-
dence obtained by unauthorized surveillance, by surveillance not in con-
formity with the authorization, or by surveillance made pursuant to
an authorization order insufficient on its face. This provision applies
to trials, hearings, or proceedings before any court, agency or authority
of the United States, any State, or political subdivision thereof.
Section 2518 (8) (d) requires that the person subjected to surveil-
lance be notified of that fact within ninety days of the surveillance.
Such notification may be delayed for good cause shown to a judge of
competent jurisdiction.
The Omnibus Crime Control Act also prohibits the manufacture,
possession and rt1.Aieing nf wire or oral communication
intercepting devices836 to the general public.
Section 2510 provides for the recovery of civil damages. Damages
are to include actual as well as punitive damages, and the plaintiff is
also permitted to recover attorney's fees.
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE IN MONTANA
AND MONTANA HOUSE BILL 3843T
At present a Montana prosecutor is unable to use evidence obtained
through electronic surveillance by state or local law enforcement officers.
Section 2516 (2) of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act provides
that:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal
prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, if such
attorney is authorized by a statute of that state to make application
to a state court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order au-
thorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communi-
cations, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in
conformity with section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable
State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception
of wire or oral communications by investigative or law enforcement
"Id. at § 2518 (4-5).
-Id. at § 2512.
87H.B. 384, 42nd Session (1971). Introduced by Representatives Lucas (Republican
from Custer County) and Lanthorne (Republican from Lewis and Clark County).
[Vol. 32
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officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense
of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or
dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana or other dangerous drugs, or
other crime dangerous to life, limb, or property, and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, designated in any appli-
cable State statute authorizing such interception, or any conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
As noted above, evidence obtained by unauthorized interception is
inadmissible and can be suppressed in criminal prosecutions in state
courts. Montana does not have a statute authorizing the prosecutor to
apply for a court order authorizing such interception.
In deed, the Revised Codes of Montana have only six sections that
could be construed to pertain to electronic surveillance. Three of these,
R.C.M. 1947, Sections 94-3321, 94-3322 and 94-35-220 are concerned with
telegraphic communications. Sections 94-3321 and 94-3322 prohibit the
disclosure or alteration of a telegram without a court order or permis-
sion of the addressee. Section 94-35-220 prohibits the learning of the
contents of a telegram by machine, instrument, contrivance, or any
other manner. The fourth section 94-3203 prohibits the tapping of tele-
phone or telegraph lines by any means and by any persons, apparently
including law enforcement officers. The last two statutes, Sections 94-
35-274 and 94-35-275, 38 have not been construed and are evidently
relatively unknown. Section 94-35-275 probably should be construed as
providing an exception to a law enforcement official from the mis-
demeanor sanctions of Section 94-35-274. Under the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Bill, any wiretap that a county attorney might attempt to establish
under this statute would be illegal for failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Berger39 and Katz40 .
Even though the prosecutor in Montana is precluded by the pro-
visions of 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. from using evidence gathered by local
law enforcers through the use of electronic surveillance techniques,
knowledge of the statutes' authorization provisions may still be relevant
in some cases. For example, a Montana prosecutor may have occasion
to use such evidence which has been gathered by federal law enforce-
ment officers investigating suspected federal crimes.
Under the state option that is provided for in Title I141 states may
adopt statutes that permit wiretapping on the state and local level. On
81REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 94-35-274 (1947). [Hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947.]
This section states: "It shall be unlawful to record or cause to be recorded by use
of any hidden electronic or mechanical device which reproduces a human conversa.-
tion without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation. Violation hereof shall
constitute a misdemeanor." R.C.M. 1947, § 94-35-275. (This section states: "Section
94-35-274 shall not apply to duly elected or appointed public officials or employees
when such transcription or recording is done in the performance of official duty;
and persons speaking at public meetings or given warning of such recording.")
'Berger, supra note 23.
'Katz, supra note 24.
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, 18 U.S.C.A. Chapter
119, § 2510-2520.
1971]
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February 11, 1971, Bill No. 38442 was introduced in the Montana House
of Representatives. This bill fulfilled all of the U.S. Supreme Court
requirements as set forth in Katz43 and Berger,4 4 and compiled with Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act. The Montana House of Repre-
sentatives passed the bill by a vote of 65-39; however, on February 22,
1971 the Montana Senate, by adopting an unfavorable Senate Judiciary
Committee report, killed Bill No. 384.45
This proposed bill would have authorized the Attorney General of
Montana and the 56 county attorneys, under certain specified conditions,
to engage in limited electronic surveillance. House Bill 384 incorporated
various requirements and safeguards so that the privilege of electronic
surveillance would not be abused.
Either the Attorney General or the county attorney would have
been compelled to show that reasonable grounds existed to justify a
belief that a serious offense had been or would be committed,46 and
that electronic surveillance was the only feasible method to obtain the
necessary evidence for a conviction. 47 Electronic surveillance, as stated
in House Bill 384, would have been limited to crimes involving bribery,
extortion, influencing, threatening or injuring a public officer including
jurors or witnesses. The bill also would have authorized electronic sur-
veillance for crimes involving serious bodily harm and the sale of dan-
gerous drugs. 8 The Montana bill was slightly more restrictive than the
Omnius. Crime Control Act jn that is did- not provide, as does Title III,
for electronic surveillance in situations involving threats to property.49
The Montana bill also provided for a maximum fine of $500 and/or con-
finement for up to six months in the county jail for any unauthorized
electronic surveillance.50
In order to obtain an authorization for electronic surveillance, either
the county attorney or the Attorney General would have been com-
pelled to comply with the application section of House Bill 384. 51 This
section required that the application for an electronic surveillance must
include: (1) the identity of the officer making the surveillance; (2) a
statement of the facts giving rise to the belief that electronic surveillance
2IH.B. 384, 42nd Session (1971).
'"Katz, supra note 24.
4 Berger, supra note 23.
'
5H.B. 384, 42nd Session (1971). Members of the' Senate Judiciary Committee are:
Leonard Vainio, Jean Turnage, Stan Stephens, James Shea, Jack Rehberg, Jim Moore,
William Hafferman, John Sheehy and P. J. Gilfeather. According to Governor Ander-
son 's Office, the only votes that were recorded were the third reading's floor vote,
which is an oral vote of yea and nay.
'Id. at § (4) (d) (i-ii).
"Id. at § (4) (d) (iii).
1id. at § (4) (d) (i).
'Ord.
19Id. at § (3).
"Id. at §§ (5) (a) (i-v), (b), (c) (i-iv), (d) (i-v), and (e).
[Vol. 32
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is necessary; (3) a statement why other procedures of investigation
would lead or have led to failure; (4) a statement concerning whether
other applications have been previously submitted concerning electronic
surveillance in the particular situation; (5) the identity of the persons
for whom the surveillance is planned; (6) the nature and location of
the surveillance equipment; (7) description of the type of communi-
cation sought to be intercepted; (8) the identity of the agency attempt-
ing to establish the surveillance; and (9) a statement detailing the period
of time for which the electronic surveillance is to be authorized. Al-
though a time limit of 30 days was the maximum period of time for
which any electronic surveillance could be conducted, the bill provided
that an extension of this time period could be granted upon proof of
the necessity of such extension. 52
The defeated bill is similar to an electronic surveillance bill that was
to be submitted to the 1973 Montana legislature as part of the new
criminal law proposals that were drafted by the Montana Criminal Law
Revision Commission. Due to the defeat of Bill No. 384, the Montana
Criminal Law Revision proposals will not include a "wiretap" bill. For
the present at least, any electronic surveillance that is done in Montana
must be under the authority of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, and
the fruits of any unauthorized state surveillance will not be admissible
into evidence at a trial.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW IN REGARD TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
In the last two years, the Supreme Court has handed down several
decisions in regard to electronic surveillance. Alderman v. United States,
Ivanov v. United States, and Butenko v. United States,53 were decided in
1969. Alderman was convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous
threats in interstate commerce, and Ivanov and Butenko were convicted
of conspiring to transmit to the Soviet Union information relating to the
national defense of the United States. In all of these cases, the Federal
Government utilized information that had been obtained through the
use of electronic surveillance. The government contended that no in-
formation was obtained through the use of electronic surveillance that
was relevant to the decision of the defendants' guilt. For this reason,
the government refused to permit the defendants to examine the evi-
dence that was obtained through the use of electronic surveillance.
In a 6-3 decision the Supreme Court held that the electronic sur-
veillance records of the Federal Government must be turned over to the
defendants in order to determine whether or not the information ob-
tained through the surveillance had made a substantial contribution
"Id. at § (5) (f).
"Alderman v. United States, Ivanov v. United States, and Butenko v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969).
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to the evidence that was used against the defendants. The Supreme
Court stated that this would preserve the adversary system of criminal
law. The prosecution would have to convince the trial court that all
of the evidence that was produced against the defendants was inde-
pendent in origin, and the defendants would have an ample opportunity
to show that the evidence of the Government was "tainted" by an illegal
electronic surveillance.5 4
The Justice Department under the Nixon Administration has en-
larged the statutory limitations of the Omnibus Crime Control Act by
claiming the right to eavesdrop without judicial authorization in cases
where it believes that domestic persons are trying to "attack and sub-
vert the government by unlawful ,,eans. ' ' 5 This authority is alleged
to arise from the duty of the President to defend the Nation's security,
and is claimed to be independent of court supervision and the limitations
of the Constitutional safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.
The department of Justice has revealed that the late Reverend
Martin Luther King Jr.; Muhammad Ali; Elija Muhammad, head
of the Black Muslims; Lawrence Plamandon, a white militant; and
five of the Chicago Seven defendants: David Dellinger, Bobby
Seale, Jerry Rubin, Tom Hayden, and Rennie Davis were victims of
illicit electronic surveillance. By early 1971, federal district courts
were asked to rule on this "new" policy of the Department of
Justice.'
The federal district courts, in the Chicago Seven case, 57 affirmed
this position. However, other federal courts have ruled against the
position of the government. The Justice Department asked the 6th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati on February 5, 1971, to set aside a
ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Damon J. Keith of Detroit. Judge
Keith ruled against the Justice Department's electronic surveillance
policies in the case of an alleged bombing by White Panther Lawrence
"Pun" Planiandon. Keith held that the Attorney General, acting for
the President, has no authority to conduct electronic surveillance in
domestic national security cases without prior court approval. On April
8. 1971, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Di-
vision and Honorable Damon J. Keithj s held that the federal govern-
ment cannot conduct wiretaps of domestic groups without a court order.
INardone, supra note 12.
5Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Feb. 19, 1971, at 429-30. This article pro-
vides a comprehensive study of the current wiretapping issue.
MId. at 430.
6People v. Hoffman, 260 N.E.2d 351 (1970).
'United States of America v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, Damon J. Keith, 39 U.S.L.W. 2574, _. F.2d .... (5th Cir.
1971). The court stated at 2575: "It should be noted that the Fourth Amendment
judicial review requirements do not prohibit the President from defending the exist-
ence of the state. Nor does the Fourth Amendment require that law enforcement offi-
cials be deprived of electronic surveillance, What the Fourth Amendment does is to
establish the method they must follow."
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With regard to unauthorized "electronic surveillance" the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Clay,59 held that foreign
intelligence surveillance without judicial warrant was not a constitutional
violation. The problem of unauthorized electronic surveillance of espion-
age agents will have to be resolved by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Various arguments exist for and against legalized electronic sur-
veillance.60 Opponents to electronic surveillance usually argue that any
evidence obtained in this manner is a clear violation of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and is a
pernicious invasion of the right to privacy. Opponents also claim that
this is the first step towards a police state in that the "suspect" is com-
pletely unaware of this surveillance. Secret spying has no place in a
democracy and is not consistent with the goals of our nation.
The proponents of this type of surveillance usually believe that
law enforcement officials should be free to pursue all of the modern
scientific iiventions to aid the police in apprehending criminals. The
proponents also claim that electronic surveillance is in the public in-
terest, and that statutes can be passed which regulate against the pos-
sible abuses that may exist. The argument is also put forth that police
are going to use electronic surveillance whether or not the information
obtained is admissible at a trial, and therefore, statutes should be passed
to regulate against this possible abuse.
Attorney General Mitchell is strongly in favor of the use of elec-
tronic surveillance and believes that this is one of the most effective
tools of the modern law enforcement officer.6' Former Attorney General
Ramsay Clark believes that electronic surveillance should be reserved
for cases involving our national security.62 Mr. Clark believes that wire-
tapping is a waste of time, money, and talent and that any evidence
obtained is of limited value in the courts.
Wiretapping is an emotionally charged issue, and no one seemes
to have a clear conception of its worth. A Gallup Poll, 8 in August of
1969, found the nation divided on wiretapping, with 46 per cent favoring
the practice, 47 per cent opposed to the practice, and 7 per cent unde-
cided. Only time, and the Supreme Court of the United States, will be
able to answer all of the problems that have been raised by expanded
use of electronic surveillance.
"United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, limited to question
4, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971).
1114 Cong. Ree. 14706-14745 (1968). (Debate of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Bill).
OCongressional Quarterly, supra note 55 at 430.
621d.
631d.
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CONCLUSION
Do the benefits of legalized electronic surveillance outweigh the
possible infringements that could take place to Fourth Amendment
Rights? This is a question that one must answer for himself. Can any-
one doubt that electronic surveillance is a desirable police weapon when
used to apprehend the espionage agent, the radical bomber, and the
kidnapper? On the other hand, should law enforcement officials be
given the means to invade the homes of private citizens in order to search
out these types of criminals? If permitted, are law enforcement officials,
especially on the state and local level, able to use "electronic surveil-
lance" with the necessary discretion or would these officials abuse this
Power
As seen from the case law cited in this note, law enforcement agen-
cies have conducted extensive "electronic surveillance" for the past 75
years. Perhaps mandatory training schools should be established for
local, state, and federal law enforcement officials in order to instruct
and to explain the potential advantages and the vast responsibilities
that accompany "electronic surveillance." No one would doubt the com-
petency of Federal Agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, in establishing, maintaining, and removing an "electronic surveil-
lance" device. State officials, if permitted by the enactment of elec-
tronic surveillance laws, would need instruction in the proper methods
Sof Lsab.ish~'lnl anlt rn i urv tt U. 0 l C~ a miiiaiii '
be explained to the state and local police in order to insure that the
evidence that is obtained by "electronic surveillance" is admissible as
evidence for prosecution.
Each individual and each state must make their own policy judg-
ment as to whether "electronic surveillance" is beneficial or detrimental
to the public and to the law enforcement officials. If a state decides
in favor of "electronic surveillance" then it must also set standards, as
was done in Title III of the Omnibus Control Bill, to control the use
of this electronic eavesdropping.
No statistical evidence is available to indicate whether or not elec-
tronic surveillance deters criminals or provides evidence that would
enable the state to obtain more convictions. Perhaps urban states would
benefit more from a state "electronic surveillance" statute than would
a primarily rural state such as Montana. Do the "benefits" of crime con-
trol outweigh the possible infringements to Constitutional Rights? Be-
fore a wiretapping bill is enacted in any state, the state must make a
judgment on this balancing of interests.
JOHN B. DUDIS, JR.
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